

U S S R I N T E R N A T I O N A L A F F A I R S

Dec. 8, 1958

SOVIET DECLARATION ON SURPRISE ATTACKS

Moscow, TASS, in English Hellschreiber to Europe, Dec. 7, 1958,
1650 GMT--L

(Text) Moscow--The following declaration of the Soviet government was read out on instructions from the Soviet Government by the Soviet representative at the Geneva experts conference on measures to prevent surprise attack, on Nov. 28, this year:

The Soviet Government, taking into consideration the international tension obtaining in recent years and the continuing dangerous stepping up of the armaments of the powers, especially atomic and hydrogen weapons, has proposed that the states should take a number of urgent measures to restrict the arms race, in particular to put an end to nuclear tests, and that agreement should be reached on measures to prevent the possibility of **surprise** attack by one state on another.

N.S. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, in his message of July 2 to President Eisenhower of the United States, suggested that appropriate representatives, appointed by the governments of the Soviet Union and the United States, and possibly the governments of some other states, should meet for a joint study of the practical aspects of the question of measures to prevent surprise attack by one state on another and should submit their recommendations.

At the same time it was emphasized that this problem has become most acute of late because the United States introduce the dangerous practice of flights by American military planes carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs over the territories of a number of West European states and over arctic regions, in the direction of the frontiers of the USSR.

As a result of agreement reached, a conference of representatives of the states opened in Geneva on Nov. 10 to draft proposals on measures to prevent the danger of surprise attack. The convening of this conference was met in all countries, including the Soviet Union, with great satisfaction and the hope that agreement would be reached there on one of the most acute international questions, an agreement the significance of which will not be denied by anyone.

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A success at the conference that has opened would undoubtedly signify a big advance toward easing tension in the relations between states, above all, between the big powers, would help to end the "cold war" and to establish confidence between them. It would do much to facilitate a solution of other international problems on which agreement could not yet be reached.

Success of the conference requires, above all, that all participants take a firm decision not to admit any actions as would make pointless a discussion of the question of measures to prevent surprise attack.

But can one speak seriously of working out such measures when American planes are making the above-mentioned flights with loads of atomic and hydrogen bombs. Of course not. The attempts to justify such flights by allegations that they are necessary for the safeguarding of the security of the United States or by assertions that they are "routine training flights" are utterly unfounded, as it is impossible to prove that U.S. security depends on round-the-clock flights of aircraft thousands of kilometers away from the United States own frontiers. It is also beyond dispute that such flights represent a grave danger to peace to which the Soviet Government has more than once called the attention of the Government of the United States and of the governments of other NATO countries. For this reason, so long as these flights continue, any agreement to reduce the danger of surprise attacks would be deprived of much of its sense and could only mislead the peoples into a false illusion that some steps have been taken to lessen the danger of surprise attack whereas nothing of the kind has actually been done.

The Soviet Government believes that for the United States to undertake to allow no more flights of military aircraft with atomic and hydrogen bombs in the direction of the Soviet frontiers and over the territory of other states would contribute in a large measure to the achievement of agreement on steps to be taken to set up a system for the prevention of surprise attacks, the goal all parties to the talks should strive to achieve.

It goes without saying that a reliable system for the prevention of surprise attack can be established only after the prohibition of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons coupled with the withdrawal of these weapons from national armaments and with the destruction of the available stockpiles, and also after conventional armaments and armed forces have been substantially reduced at the same time.

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Yet, even in the present situation in which the Western powers are not prepared, as shown by the experience of disarmament talks over many years, to agree to the banning of nuclear weapons and a substantial reduction of conventional armaments, there is a possibility of agreement being reached on some practical steps toward reducing the danger of surprise attacks. The most important of these steps, in the Soviet Government's judgement, could be first the establishment of ground control posts and second, aerial surveys of appropriate area.

The achievement of an agreement on these measures is facilitated by the fact that the United States, as follows from President Eisenhower's message to N. S. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, raises no objection in principle to the Soviet Union's proposal for the establishment of a network of ground control posts while the Soviet Union agrees, as repeatedly stated by the USSR Government, to the proposal for aerial inspection of certain areas.

The Soviet Government proposes agreement to be reached on the following concrete measures:

Ground control posts:

It is proposed that ground control posts should be set up at railway junctions, in big ports, and on highways with the object of guarding against dangerous concentrations of armed forces and armaments in these points.

These posts should be installed--subject to agreement with the countries concerned--at points to be agreed upon in the territories of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Turkey, Iran, in the western border regions of the Soviet Union and the eastern littoral of the United States.

The Soviet Union agrees to 28 control posts being established within the boundaries of such a zone on the territory of the Warsaw treaty countries--bearing in mind, of course, the consent of the governments of the countries concerned--including 6 posts in the USSR, and 54 posts on the territory of the NATO and Baghdad pact countries, including 6 posts on the territory of the United States.

In the opinion of the Soviet Government, the establishment of ground control posts at railway junctions, in big ports, and on highways could be an effective means of reducing the risk of surprise attack. Hardly anyone will deny that preparation for an up-to-date big war, even given the existence of nuclear weapons, is inevitably connected with the necessity of concentrating at certain points large military units with a great amount of armaments and techniques: planes, tanks, artillery, warships, submarines, land, air, and sea transport.

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The task of the ground control posts suggested by the Soviet Union should include observation to guard against dangerous concentration of armed forces and armaments. This task can well be accomplished, since the preparations for largescale troop movements by rail, by road or through big ports cannot be camouflaged and the setting up of control posts in such points will make it possible to detect such preparations in good time.

As for the area in which to situate the ground control posts, the selection is determined by the fact that the concentration of troops and armaments is inevitable primarily in places where big contingents of the armed forces of the two sides are stationed opposite each other where, as historical experience has shown, an outbreak of a military conflict is most likely. In such an area one must include Europe, which was the main theater of military operations in the last two world wars and where today the main forces of the two military groups of states, NATO and the Warsaw treaty organization, are concentrated.

The area of distribution of the ground control posts cannot but include such territories as Greece, Turkey, and Iran. And this is quite natural since Greece and Turkey as NATO members take part in all military measures affected by this alignment and, moreover, have military bases on their territories spearheaded against the Warsaw treaty countries. As for Iran, this country being like Turkey a member of the Baghdad pact, has of late been increasingly involved in the military measures taken by the members of this pact.

The circumstance should also be taken into consideration that, inasmuch as the proposal for ground control posts affects the territory of all the signatories of the Warsaw treaty, at least a majority of the NATO member countries of Europe should, of course, be included in the zone of distribution wherein these posts are to be stationed.

If all the states participating in the Geneva conference agree to the necessity of drafting specific measures to prevent the danger of surprise attack, they cannot but consent to the establishment of ground control posts as one of such measures, primarily in Europe and in the territories of the aforesaid Middle Eastern countries.

Zones of aerial survey:

As a means of preventing surprise attack the Government of the USSR proposes that a zone of aerial survey should be set up in Europe to a depth of 800 kilometers to the east and west of the boundary line between the main armed forces of the NATO and the Warsaw treaty countries, and for the reasons given above, that the zone should also embrace Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

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Notwithstanding the importance of setting up zones of aerial survey in Europe and on the territory of Turkey and Iran, aerial survey has also a definite importance in other regions of the world. Accordingly, the Soviet Government proposes an aerial inspection zone to be established in the Far East and in the territory of the United States, to cover the territory of the USSR east of 108 degrees eastern longitude and an equal area in the United States west of 90 degrees western longitude as well as the whole of the territory of Japan and the island of Okinawa. The necessity to include Japan in this zone is dictated by the fact that the foreign military bases and foreign troops in the territory of Japan, including the island of Okinawa, can be used for surprise attacks. For this reason there would be no justification for leaving Japan outside the aerial inspection zone in the area.

Furthermore, the Soviet Government proceeds from the premise that no aerial inspection zone can be established in the Far East and in U.S. territory unless agreement is achieved on setting up ground control posts and aerial inspection zones in Europe and in the Middle East. This follows from the special importance of the European continent as the most dangerous area wherein, as stated above, two main military potentials of the two military and political alignments, NATO and the Warsaw treaty organizations, stand opposed to each other.

On steps for nations to take to insure effective measures to prevent surprise attacks;

The Soviet Government considers that neither ground control posts nor aerial survey can by themselves reduce the danger for surprise attack, particularly with modern types of weapons in existence. This is even more understandable in the light of the fact that the establishment of ground control posts and aerial surveys will not involve the existing means of surprise attack and would not lead either to their reduction or to such means being removed from certain, most potentially dangerous regions.

Ground control posts and aerial surveys cannot be effective in reducing the danger of surprise attack unless associated with steps toward reducing the troop concentrations of the opposing military and political alignments in the potentially most dangerous areas of Europe and also toward preventing the storing of the most formidable and destructive weapons of mass annihilation, in the first place, at least on part of the territory of Central Europe, to wit, the territory of both parts of Germany.

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Accordingly, the Soviet Government proposes agreement be reached on reduction of the strength of the foreign armed forces in the territory of European states and storing no modern weapons of mass destruction on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the GDR... (TASS ellipsis)

On a reduction of foreign forces in Europe by one third:

To achieve the above-mentioned goals, the Soviet Government proposes agreement to be reached on a reduction, at least by one third, of the foreign armed forces stationed in the territory of the European countries which would be included in the control zone to be agreed upon.

No one will deny that the concentration of foreign armed forces on the territory of European states has been one of the main reasons leading to the present strained situation in Europe, which is daily unnerving the peoples of Europe whose life can in many respects be likened to life on a volcano, and this situation has been aggravated by the latest measures carried out by NATO. In disregard of the danger to the security of the European peoples, represented by such a policy, the powers principally responsible for NATO's activity persist in exerting gross pressure on the European NATO countries, pushing them along the dangerous road of a further build-up of forces in Europe equipped with modern arms, including atomic, hydrogen, and rocket weapons.

A reduction, at least by one third, of the foreign armed forces stationed on the territory of European countries would be a first step toward normalizing the situation in Europe. The Soviet Government believes that given the good will of both sides it would be possible to agree on this question because this, far from impairing the security of either side, would strengthen European security. Such a step would set the minds of the European peoples at rest and would go far toward reducing mistrust which is injuring international relations.

On storing no nuclear and rocket weapons in Germany:

The policy adopted by the leading NATO powers to store nuclear and rocket weapons in European countries represents a particular danger to people in Europe. No one can deny the danger arising from the equipment of the armed forces of the NATO countries with modern weapons of mass annihilation and from the conversion of the territory of these countries into military and strategic jumping-off grounds.

The greatest danger to the people of the European countries is represented by the policy of the leading NATO powers to supply these weapons to the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany where the revenge-seeking forces, harboring plans for armed aggression against the neighboring countries, are rearing their heads higher and higher. Yet this is just the course that is today becoming the sum and substance of the policy of the German Federal Republic and of the policies of the Western powers in Europe, although it is fraught with a grave danger to peace and, above all, to Western Germany, to which the Soviet Government has called the attention of the Government of the German Federal Republic more than once.

If the guiding desire is to work out practical steps to reduce the danger of surprise attack, instead of limiting the whole thing to a pointless discussion of this danger, these steps, in the Soviet Government's opinion, should be accompanied by a commitment to be assumed by the countries possessing nuclear and rocket weapons to refrain from storing atomic, hydrogen and rocket weapons in either part of Germany where the main armed forces of NATO countries and the Warsaw treaty countries come into contact and where even an insignificant incident may entail grave consequences for the destinies of peace.

Such a commitment would accord with the basic interests of the people of all European nations, rightfully concerned over the situation in Europe and conscious of the disastrous consequences that could be entailed by the use of nuclear weapons, particularly in the densely populated areas of Europe.

The assumption of such a commitment would also favorably affect the entire situation in Europe and would facilitate other measures to eliminate the danger of war. Such are the proposals of the Soviet Government which it submits for discussion at the Geneva conference.

Agreement at the conference on the setting up of ground control posts and zones of aerial survey as well as the implementation of such agreement taken together with a reduction by one third of the foreign armed forces on the territory of European states and the renunciation of the storing of nuclear and rocket weapons in both parts of Germany would attach a real meaning to the measures for the prevention of the danger of surprise attack and would signify the practical implementation of measures to reduce the danger of surprise attack which must be the desire of all parties to the conference.

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The Soviet Government regrets to note that the Western powers have another approach to the tasks of the Geneva conference, as is shown by their draft program for the conference. The content of this program boils down to the demand to concentrate the attention of the conference on an examination of the following means of surprise attack: guided missiles; long-range air force; tactical air force; ground forces; submarines adapted for launching guided missiles, and so forth.

This program virtually does not raise the question of measures to prevent surprise attack or of any practical steps with this object in view. Can it be said in such conditions that the program accords with the task of drafting measures to prevent or reduce surprise attack? The answer to this question is in the negative.

The question arises what is the point of studying, for instance, such means as intercontinental rockets if atomic and hydrogen weapons are not banned, though the Soviet Government has been insisting for more than 12 years on the prohibition of these weapons as weapons of mass annihilation of human beings. The Soviet Union, as before, is willing to accept the complete prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, and rocket weapons as well as a substantial reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and is willing to sign a relevant agreement. If the Western powers took the same stand nuclear and rocket weapons would have been banned a long time ago. Their position in the United Nations, however, shows that they are not willing to accept such a measure.

It is not concealed in the West at present, as shown by numerous pronouncements in the press of the United States, Britain, France, and other NATO countries, that in advancing the above program for the Geneva conference the Western powers want to ascertain the military potential of the Warsaw treaty countries, primarily as regards up-to-date weapons, and want to make the conference serve this purpose.

Evidently this is not a very modest desire. But if the Soviet Union and its allies attending the conference began to act likewise this would, in the final analysis, lead to a competition in attempts to obtain the largest possible military intelligence. It is possible that such information would be of interest to certain departments of one or the other side, but is this really the purpose of the conference? Is it not clear that the conference would in such a case but intensify the mutual distrust and suspicions between the powers?

It is but natural that the Soviet Government cannot be the accomplice of those who want not the prevention of surprise attack but seek to substitute for this task the collection of intelligence information concerning the up-to-date types of atomic, hydrogen, rocket, and other weapons the Soviet Union possesses.

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The Soviet Government is convinced that agreement on measures to reduce the danger of surprise attack is quite feasible if the parties to the conference would respect the legitimate interests of each other's security and would refrain from actions leading to an aggravation of international tension and mutual suspicions, and would sincerely strive for agreement.

The Soviet Government on its part is willing to continue doing its utmost so that the Geneva conference may produce practical results with regard to measures aimed at reducing the danger of surprise attack and, hence, at reducing the danger of another war.

Geneva Session

Moscow, TASS, in English Hellschreiber to Europe, Dec. 5, 1958,
1818 GMT--L

(Text) Geneva--The experts conference on safeguards against surprise attacks held its regular meeting today with the Czechoslovak representative in the chair. Statements were made by the representatives of the USSR, Poland, and Britain. The British delegate submitted to the conference for consideration the third working document pertaining to the third item of the Western experts' program. The document is a general review of the presumable system of observation and inspection over ground forces.

The next meeting is scheduled for Dec. 8.

WEST STILL DODGES A-TEST BAN AGREEMENT

Moscow, Soviet Home Service, Dec. 6, 1958, 0400 GMT--L

(PRAVDA editorial: "Tests of Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons Must Be Discontinued for all Times")

(Text) Negotiations between the representatives of the USSR, the United States, and Britain on the discontinuance of the tests of nuclear weapons have been conducted since Oct. 31 in Geneva. The peoples of all countries are attributing great significance to that conference and expect from it the achievement of an agreement which would put an end to the competition in the creation of ever new types of the most destructive weapons, which would liquidate the threat to the health of the present generation and of generations to come.

Unfortunately it is already five weeks, a time more than sufficient to work out and sign an agreement, yet the Geneva conference is making no headway. The United States and Britain still continue to dodge the conclusion of an agreement.

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Their representatives in Geneva are actually refusing to reach agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests and are detracting the conference by every means from its principal task. All this cannot fail to arouse alarm among world public opinion.

In the declaration of the Soviet Government on the issue of discontinuance of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons, published in PRAVDA on Dec. 4, the attitude of the Soviet Government has been precisely and clearly expressed. As the declaration says, the Soviet Government is convinced that an immediate general discontinuance of experimental explosions of the atomic and hydrogen bombs is the first and urgent step which should be made along the path leading to radical solution of the disarmament problem and to the final freeing of mankind from the threat of atomic warfare.

The Soviet Union, just as all socialist countries, has been doing everything and still does everything with a view to safeguarding peace all over the world. The Soviet people have ahead of them majestic prospects of peaceful constructive work--the majestic program of communist construction outlined in the theses of Khrushchev's report to the 21st party congress on the target figures of the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1959 to 1965.

"We do not need war," says N.S. Khrushchev, "we need peace. Peace is needed not only by our country: vitally concerned in its preservation and consolidation are the people of the entire world. We are going to compete peacefully with capitalism in the economic field where controversy will be settled not by means of atomic and hydrogen weapons but by means of economic development.

During the whole postwar period the Soviet Government has been waging a resolute struggle for the discontinuance of nuclear tests. It is only due to the stubborn resistance on the part of the United States and Britain that agreement has not been forthcoming. In its endeavor to initiate an immediate and general discontinuance of nuclear explosions, the Soviet Union had since Mar. 31 discontinued, unilaterally the nuclear tests.

However, instead of imitating the noble Soviet example, the governments of United States and Britain launched a series of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons on an unprecedented scale and tried to take advantage of the fact that the Soviet Union had abandoned tests with a view to gaining maximum military advantages. Because of that attitude of the Western powers, the Soviet Union had to resume nuclear tests for the purpose of safeguarding its security.

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Nevertheless, the Soviet Union--as has been pointed out in the declaration of the Soviet Government--is prepared forthwith, on the same day as the governments of United States and Britain make known their agreement, to discontinue together with them tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons for all times, though the USSR has carried out considerably fewer experimental explosions than the Western powers.

Prompted by this wish, the Soviet Government instructed its delegation at the Geneva conference to try to achieve by every means an immediate cessation of the tests of nuclear weapons for all times.

The Soviet Union has submitted to the discussion of the Geneva conference a draft agreement on the discontinuance of the tests of the atomic and hydrogen weapon and proposed, simultaneously with its signing, to agree on problems of control over discontinuance of tests in the form of a protocol which would be part of the agreement.

Thus, the agreement on discontinuance of tests and control over its implementation would become effective simultaneously. The Soviet draft agreement provides for the establishment, for the purpose of inspection over the implementation of that agreement, of a corresponding agency having at its disposal a network of control posts.

These concrete proposals of the Soviet Government take the ground out from under the feet of those Western circles which are capitalizing on the problems of control and which turn them artificially into stumbling blocks in the way leading to agreement on discontinuance of nuclear tests.

It was quite recently that the Western powers maintained that nuclear explosions could not always be detected. Yet, the conference of technical experts in Geneva, convened at their insistence in the summer of this year, has completely confirmed the possibility of practical detection of any nuclear explosion, and hence also the possibility of an effective control of discontinuance of tests.

Deprived of the former arguments, the Western powers are resorting now to fresh maneuvers in the discussion of the control problems. So they insist that in the control agency to be set up for inspection of implementation of the agreement on the discontinuance of tests that decisions should be taken by a majority vote. Since the majority in the control agency would be on the side of the North Atlantic Bloc, this would mean establishment in that agency of the diktat of the United States and Britain. This absurd proposal of the Western powers cannot be appraised otherwise than an attempt to put one more obstacle in the way of the agreement.

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And that is also the only way the proposal of the Western powers can be assessed to set up the so-called mobile inspection groups, which are called upon to roam constantly across the countries, irrespective of whether explosions are carried out or not in their territories. This proposal blatantly contradicts the recommendations of the Geneva conference of experts and has obviously been devised by the agencies of the Western intelligence services.

In putting forward a proposal of this kind, the Western delegations at the present conference in Geneva are trying to make use of the discussion of the control problems with a view to further delaying agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

It is for the same purpose that the United States and Britain are insisting on a mere temporary discontinuance of the tests for a term of one year. As is known, such a term is necessary for working on the results of the series of explosions carried out and for preparations for the next series. This means that in putting forward the proposal, the United States and Britain are trying to gain military advantages over the Soviet Union and to preserve for themselves at the same time the freedom of action for the resumption of the nuclear tests at any time convenient to them. This proposal is, of course, absolutely unacceptable.

The governments of United States and Britain continue to demand discontinuance of nuclear tests conditional upon satisfactory progress in the issue of disarmament in general. The whole world knows that American-British diplomacy is exerting every effort with view to precluding solution of that problem both as a whole and in part.

One need not go far for an example. Suffice it to say that at the conference of experts of the 10 countries on measures for preventing a surprise attack which is also in session in Geneva, the Western delegations do not want to discuss practical proposals of this kind. It proved that they are interested only in collection of intelligence data about the armed forces and armaments of the socialist countries. Seen in this light, the attempts of American-British diplomacy to make an agreement on discontinuance of nuclear tests conditional upon the solution of other problems of disarmament can mean only one thing: the ruling circles of the United States and Britain, obviously, do not desire either a reduction of armaments or the cessation of test explosions. This is the only conclusion which world public opinion can draw.

The Soviet Government states in its declaration that it will continue to strive for an immediate and general discontinuance for nuclear tests for all times.

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Everything now depends on whether the governments of the United States and Britain are prepared sincerely to meet the Soviet Union halfway. The reason and the conscience of all rightminded people on earth cannot tolerate continuation of the dangerous nuclear armament race. Countless millions of people all over the world deem discontinuance of nuclear tests the most urgent, the most acute, the most vital problem of our time, and are warmly welcoming the proposal of the Soviet Union aimed at an immediate solution of that problem.

Together with all peace-loving peoples, the Soviet people are resolutely demanding that an end be put to the subterfuges of the Western powers which hinder agreement on discontinuance of nuclear tests. Our people are unanimously supporting the noble attitude of the Soviet Government and its wise proposal. The tests of the atomic and hydrogen weapon must be discontinued everywhere and for all time.

Soviet Proposals

Moscow, TASS, in English Hellschreiber to Europe, Dec. 7, 1958,
1935 GMT--L

(B. Novikov report from Geneva)

(Text) Ambassador S.K. Tsarapkin, the USSR representative at the Geneva three-power conference on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, read out at the Nov. 29 meeting a declaration of the Soviet Government on the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests and submitted for the consideration of the conference a draft agreement on the cessation of these tests.

These highly important documents, published in the Soviet press on Dec. 4, are in the focus of attention of world opinion and engendered among many people the hope that the conference will have favorable results. Commenting on these documents which show clearly the wish of the Soviet Government to ease the solution of the problem of ending nuclear weapons tests, the newspaper LA SUISSE qualified the Soviet Government's proposals as "a splendid Christmas gift." The newspaper TRIBUNE DE GENEVE assessed the proposals as a "big advance."

At the same time the Soviet documents have caused some confusion among the circles of Western delegations at the conference. The point is that the Western powers, concealing from the public the Soviet Union's sincere desire for agreement on stopping the tests, are intensely spreading rumors that the USSR is allegedly afraid of control over the observance of an agreement on the cessation of tests and does not want to discuss the question of control, in any case until an agreement on the cessation of the tests is signed.

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Yet the USSR position on the question of control has been quite definite from the very outset. It is common knowledge that Soviet representatives took a most active part in the Geneva conference of technical experts held in July and August of this year in order to study the means (words indistinct) the conference recommendations concerning the organization of a control system.

Discussion of questions pertaining to control was also envisaged in the draft agenda for the present conference submitted by the Soviet delegation in the first few days of the conference. At last, (words indistinct) Soviet delegation proposed that the documents on the cessation of the tests and on the setting up of a control system should be signed at the conference simultaneously.

Can one really draw the conclusion from this that the USSR wants somehow to evade control? Of course not. But, the USSR has always emphasized that one must know what to control before discussing the question of how to control. The United States and Great Britain, however, shunning a discussion of the problem of stopping tests and placing in the foreground questions on control with the obvious object of dragging out the conference, seek to conceal from the world public opinion on their positions and to depict the matter as if the Soviet Union was to blame for the dragging of the conference. It is for this purpose that the Soviet position on control is being misrepresented.

Publication of the Soviet Government documents exposed once again before the world world the fabrication that the USSR was against and manifested the Soviet Union's spirit of cooperation. This fact has thrown the Western delegations into confusion.

After studying the Soviet documents, the U.S. delegation hastened to introduce a new proposal to the effect that the obligation to stop tests and set up a control system should be included not only in one document but also in one, the first, article of the agreement. Later, evidently sensing the obvious insolvency of such a position, the U.S. delegation abandoned this proposal and submitted the draft of two articles of the agreement, one speaking of the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and the other of control. These were virtually the first documents throughout the conference presented by the Western side on a question which has a direct bearing on an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. On Dec. 6 the members of the conference having examined the Soviet and American drafts, agreed on and endorsed the text of Art. 1 of an agreement on banning nuclear weapons tests.

The publication of the Soviet Government's declaration and the Soviet draft agreement on the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests facilitated the first considerable progress at the conference.